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Background 
While there is much literature describing the assumptions, issues, and effectiveness of crime 
suppression (e.g., Decker, 2003; Decker and Reed, 2002; Katz and Webb, 2006; McCorkle and 
Miethe, 2002) and prevention strategies (Esbensen and Osgood, 1997), much less attention has 
been paid to gang intervention programming, particularly gang truces. Little is known about 
how often gang truces occur, what conditions give rise to them, the role of third parties in 
brokering them, their transformative effects, and their effectiveness. In this policy brief, 
sponsored by SolucionES1 and conducted by FUNDE, a member of the SolucionES Alliance with 
Arizona State University, we systematically evaluate gang truces; including reviewing prior 
research and presenting evidence on the effectiveness of gang truces that have been 
implemented in El Salvador, Honduras, and Jamaica for the purpose of identifying lessons 
learned should other governments or donors wish to support gang truces in these or other 
countries. 
Summary of Findings 
We found that the truce in El Salvador resulted in a reduction in homicides that was not the 
product of other trends or temporal factors. Thus, the truce in this country had a short-term 
effect in reducing the lethality of violent crime, though not necessarily in other dimensions of 
insecurity. By contrast, the truces in Jamaica and Honduras resulted in no impact on violence.  
The Jamaican and Honduran experiences therefore mirror the results of prior gang truces that 
have been studied to various extents, including those in Los Angeles and Trinidad and Tobago.  
                                                          
1 SolucionES is multifaceted violence prevention program being implemented by an Alliance of five leading 
Salvadoran non-profit organizations who have come together to prevent crime and violence. The Alliance 
members are: Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE), Fundación Salvadoreña para la Salud y el Desarrollo 
Humano (FUSAL), Fundación Crisálida (known locally as Glasswing), Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo 
Económico y Social (FUSADES), and Fundación Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo (FEPADE) with partial 
funding from USAID/El Salvador.  Together, these five organizations have widely-recognized expertise in education, 
health, community development, economic development, research, and youth leadership; they are bringing their 
combined synergy and strengths to prevent crime and violence in El Salvador. SolucionES is using a three-pronged 
strategy to prevent crime and violence in El Salvador: 1) Strengthen municipal crime and violence prevention 
capabilities and actions, 2) Increase social investment by the private sector to prevent crime and violence, and 3) 
Research, publish, and disseminate findings to inform decision-making on crime and violence prevention. This is 
one of 10 planned policy-oriented studies.  The full study is available on request. 
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Important differences in how the various truces were negotiated may explain the different 
results and one important difference – the ability of government and non-gang community 
stakeholders to promise and immediately produce measurable deliverables – appear to be 
especially significant. 
Prior Evaluations of Gang Truces 
Little research to date has examined the effectiveness of gang truces, and much of the research 
that does exist has been restricted to the field of public health.  Studies of a gang truce in South 
Central Los Angeles between the Crips and Bloods by Cotton (1992) and Ordog et al. (1993; 
1995) found temporary reductions in the number of homicides and gunshot wounds during the 
truce, but these studies failed to point out that despite about a 35 percent decrease in 
homicides for the first three months of the truce, 
homicides then doubled in months four through 
eleven, compared with the pre-truce period. 
Similar findings were reported in Trinidad and 
Tobago (Maguire, Katz and Wilson, 2013), where 
violence declined for a brief period of time 
(again, for about three months), but then 
increased substantially over the long term (12 
months). These results suggest that gang truces 
may produce short-term benefits, yet result in 
long-term adverse consequences. 
Additionally these studies have suffered from a 
variety of flaws, including: 1) poor theoretical 
assumptions about gangs, including often 
ignoring that they might have the organizational 
structure and internal discipline to enforce their 
truces; 2) relatively weak evaluation designs that fail to account for other potential causes for, 
or broader trends related to, violence reductions; 3) a failure to examine the processes involved 
What is a Gang Truce?  
A gang truce is a nonviolent resolution to 
a larger conflict between groups that has 
an impact on general levels of violence 
and other forms of criminality within a 
community (Ordog et al., 1993; 1995; 
Whitehill et al. 2012).  It differs from 
conflict interruption, resolution or 
mediation efforts, which seek to rapidly 
intervene, typically through outreach 
workers or violence interruption 
specialists, in episodic violent events 
between groups in a community.  Gang 
truces often involve dialogue and 
negotiations between multiple parties 
(e.g., gangs, government, NGO’s, 
religious organizations) that seek to 
recalibrate the norms of conflict within 
and between groups for the purpose of 
reducing or eliminating violence and 
other crime. 
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in creating gang truces; 4) a failure to examine unintended consequences of the truces beyond 
their impact on gun violence; and 5) a lack of sophisticated statistical analysis capable of 
discerning overall trends, cyclic patterns, outliers, and turning points.  
Overview of Study Design 
This policy brief examines gang truces implemented in El Salvador, Jamaica, and Honduras 
including the processes undertaken with and between gangs and other stakeholders. We 
collected information about the processes associated with each gang truce from a variety of 
sources, including peer reviewed articles, books, reports, local newspaper articles, and 
interviews of persons with first-hand knowledge about the gang truce in each nation.  We 
examined the impact of each truce using official data. We first performed a simple t-test 
comparing the homicide rates before and after the truce.  We then employed time series 
models not used in other studies to evaluate homicide rates as a function of time, with truce 
period indicators included to measure the effect of the truce net of the temporal trends.  We 
also employed supplemental models to examine and control for factors other than the truce 
that might have affected homicides over the study period.   
Research Findings 
Implementing a Gang Truce 
The gang truces studied have a number of common characteristics. First, in each case a 
community was experiencing an uncharacteristically high number of gang related homicides 
over a fairly lengthy period of time, which resulted in each community placing strong pressure 
on the government in general and the justice system in particular to respond to the problem 
quickly and effectively. Second, each community had first attempted, unsuccessfully, to control 
gang violence through suppression-oriented strategies.  Third, each community’s inability to 
exercise traditional informal and formal social control to decrease levels of violence became 
self-evident to the public and government. This resulted in all involved stakeholders wanting to 
seek (or participate in) an alternative strategy in which brokers would formally and/or 
informally work directly with gang leaders to establish a truce that would reduce homicides.   
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Key stakeholders involved in the negotiation and establishment of each gang truce were also 
somewhat similar.  In each case examined, the leaders of the largest and most violently 
involved gangs were willing to participate.  In each of these cases it was clear that the gangs 
sought to collaborate with the brokers not only for the purpose of reducing violence, but 
perhaps more importantly as a means to gain greater, more positive recognition in the 
community and to reap some form of benefit to themselves, their members, and perhaps their 
community. In each case, while not always formally involved, government officials were at a 
minimum made aware of negotiations, and in some cases solicited the assistance of third 
parties to broker an agreement between stakeholders. In each case it was at least implicitly 
understood that the government would “listen” to the gang leader’s expectations and offers. 
We found that when the government was no longer willing to “listen” to or collaborate with 
brokers, the truce processes ended abruptly. Brokers were typically comprised of a very small 
group (i.e., 2-3) of individuals who were perceived to be “honest brokers.”  In El Salvador and 
Honduras this included a high ranking Catholic Church official, a leader from an international 
diplomatic organization (i.e., OAS), and other neutral parties.  In Jamaica this included a quasi-
governmental organization that had been established for the purpose of brokering negotiations 
between gangs for the purpose of reducing violence, as well as the local university, which had 
access to staff who were perceived to be neutral but had an interest in reducing violence near 
the university.   
The strategies used to execute each gang truce were generally similar, but had important 
differences. Each involved a team of brokers working to identify common goals to be achieved 
and tangibles that could be delivered to the gang in exchange for the gang achieving the stated 
goals. They differed by how each party’s promise was delivered. In Honduras and Jamaica, gang 
leaders traded violence reduction pledges for long-term government and social changes, such 
as the development of substantial public works programs to reduce unemployment. In 
Honduras and Jamaica, the government was asked to develop and deploy large scale social 
programming in a short time frame—something for which neither country had a strong track 
record. In El Salvador, by contrast, brokers secured promises for immediate changes in gang 
behavior in exchange for feasible immediate deliverables from the government. For example, in 
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exchange for a reduction in gang violence, the government agreed to immediately relocate 
imprisoned gang leaders to less restrictive prisons and provide them some privileges. Following 
the successful execution of the first part of the Salvadoran truce, which resulted in near term 
success for both parties, they began to negotiate broader issues that would take longer for both 
sides to deliver. Our findings suggest that some promised deliverables need to be easily and 
quickly delivered by both parties early in the process to achieve trust and serve as a first test 
of gang leaders’ ability to deliver. Stakeholders have only a brief period of time to provide 
promised benefits before trust is lost, meaning that tangible benefits need to be delivered in 
weeks or months, not years.  
The Impact of a Gang Truce 
El Salvador. We found that El 
Salvador’s gang truce had a definite 
impact on the homicide rate. The 
mean number of monthly homicides 
declined from about 354 prior to the 
truce to about 218 following the 
truce, for a net decrease of about 
136 homicides per month. Our data 
show that between March 2012 and 
June 2014 the truce had saved 
about 5,501 lives (see exhibit 1). 
From a hypothetical stand, it is 
possible to make the assumption that a number of these deaths averted could have been 
transformed in disappearances and therefore they were not counted within the official 
homicide statistics. However, the results from the analysis point out that the number of 
disappearances was not significantly related with the change in the global behavior of 
homicides. Additionally, over the period of analysis (January 2010 to June 2014), there was no 
significant change between the pre-truce and post-truce periods in the number of thefts, 
extortions, robberies, rapes and auto thefts/robberies. 
Exhibit 1: Forecast of homicides without gang truce. 
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We also found that the gang truce did not result in a homogenous decline in violence across 
municipalities. About 61 percent of municipalities experienced a decline in homicides, but the 
decline in violence varied substantially between municipalities. We studied this issue further by 
examining the impact of the initiative “Free Violence Municipalities” and it was found that the 
behavior of violence in those municipalities was not significantly linked to the initiative but 
rather to the general dynamic of the truce process nationwide. Additionally, we parsed out the 
relative influence of the number of MS13 and 18th Street gang members on the street and in 
prison from each municipality. Our analyses indicated that following the truce, the number of 
MS13 and 18th Street gang members on the street in a municipality was not significantly 
related to a decline in homicide, but the number of imprisoned MS13 and 18th Street gang 
members from the municipality was. In particular, the number of imprisoned MS13 gang 
members from a municipality was associated with a significant decline in homicides in that 
municipality following the gang truce and the number of imprisoned 18th Street members 
from a municipality was associated with a significant increase in homicides in that 
municipality following the truce. These findings lend support to the idea that MS13 is more 
organized than the typical street gang and that imprisoned MS13 gang members exhibit strong 
influence over their fellow gang members on the street. Our findings also suggest, however, 
that the gang truce had a boomerang effect in municipalities with high numbers of imprisoned 
18th Street members, implying that 18th Street might not have as much organizational capacity 
to regulate violence on the streets as MS13. The truce provided incarcerated MS13 and 18th 
Street gang leaders an opportunity to negotiate with high-ranking officials and influential 
diplomats, including representatives of the Organization of American States. This may have 
increased their legitimacy, inside and outside of their gangs. It appears that MS13 was able to 
exert its span of control over the communities in which they had influence, and they were able 
to deliver on the terms of the gang truce negotiations. In the case of 18th Street, however, 
incarcerated gang members may not have had the same organizational capacity for 
communicating and carrying out directives. In fact, a review of the gang truce indicated that 
there was a conflict taking place between two factions within 18th Street.  Consequently, the 
organizational structure and culture of 18th Street might be more diffuse than that of MS13, 
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and its leadership structure might not be as strong because of the internal fractures within the 
gang.  This might further explain why homicides increased in 18th Street communities.  The 
internal fractures within the 18th Street gang may have resulted in intra-gang violent conflict 
that was largely contained within 18th Street controlled territories. 
Jamaica. In Jamaica, at first glance, our impact findings appeared to show that the gang truce 
might be an effective mechanism for reducing violence. Bivariate analyses showed a significant 
decline in homicides immediately after the truce was implemented. This explains the work 
previously published by policymakers, researchers, and news reporters. Upon closer 
examination of the data, however, comparing change in the target area to other areas in 
Jamaica, and accounting for temporal trends, we found that the decline in homicide was part of 
a larger nationwide decline in violence and that the gang truce was not responsible for the 
decline. The only significant effect that we uncovered was the possibility that homicides were 
displaced outside the target area for a brief period of time, but then returned to previous 
levels. 
Honduras. Our impact findings from our analysis of data from Honduras tell a very similar story 
as Jamaica. Initial analysis showed that the number of homicides, on average, declined across 
municipalities following the gang truce. Specifically, the mean number of homicides declined by 
1.2 per 100,000 population, from an average of 6.87 per 100,000 population in each 
municipality before the truce to an average of 5.66 thereafter. However, after we examined the 
effect of the truce through time series analysis, and included a variable (month) to control for 
the temporal trends in the data, the impact of the truce we observed in our bivariate analysis 
was no longer significant. Our findings, as in Jamaica, suggest that the decline in homicides was 
less a consequence of the gang truce than of a broader short to medium term trend.  And, 
importantly, in both Jamaica and Honduras, the respective governments failed to deliver on 
gangs’ demands for large-scale social and employment programs. 
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Conclusions and Policy Implications  
Over the last several years, there have been a number of naturally occurring experiments 
involving gang truces in a variety of nations and regions. Findings from evaluations of gang 
truces are mixed.   In El Salvador the gang truce could be characterized as an effective short 
term strategy to reducing homicides. It is worth mentioning that despite homicides rates are 
above truce levels, they continue slightly below pre-truce levels. In Jamaica and Honduras the 
gang truce had no short or medium-term impact on overall violence.  In Los Angeles and 
Trinidad y Tobago there was evidence that violence decreased for at least ninety days, but then 
increased substantially beyond those rates observed prior to the gang truce.  Thus, the 
effectiveness of the truce in El Salvador appears to be isolated and must be evaluated within 
the context of other truces that have failed to reduce homicide violence.  Policy makers must 
evaluate whether the conditions that allowed short term effectiveness of the gang truce in El 
Salvador (such as the ability to promise and deliver immediate results) exist in other violent 
areas before evaluating whether a truce strategy might be appropriate.  And they should be 
heavily cautioned that the potential for long term negative consequences might outweigh the 
potential for short term benefits.  
Indeed, it is important to note that a number of scholars have noted that gang truces are likely 
to result in a boomerang effect, with gang violence increasing over the long run because of 
enhanced cohesion within the gang (Klein 1995). Maguire (2013) notes that when government 
officials negotiate a truce with gangs, they might “inadvertently be acknowledging gangs as 
legitimate social entities” (p. 11). This in itself might increase cohesion among gangs, which has 
been found to be associated with increased levels of criminality (Decker et al. 2008; Klein 1971; 
Maguire 2013).  Hence, it is important to consider the fact that gangs are illegal groups in El 
Salvador and it should be cautious when carrying out dialog or negotiation processes with 
them.  Further research is needed to examine how gang truces might impact group cohesion 
and, if it does, whether the cohesion created could be effectively directed toward more 
productive non-violent endeavors. Gang truces convey the well-intentioned image that violence 
has been addressed and policymakers are doing something about the problem, but unless the 
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truce is implemented in a manner and under conditions where immediately achievable results 
can be promised, delivered and measured, there remains a significant chance that the truce will 
fail, or worse yet, backfire. Thus, it is imperative that any type of concession made by 
Governments to gangs within a truce framework should be transparent, so that all sectors of 
society have certainty that every action is being done within the existing rule of law2.  
In the case of El Salvador, the truce arises from to the absence of effective public policies and 
practices for violence control and prevention. The truce was planned as a strategy to reduce 
gang-related homicides. During the process different organizations got involved, including 
religious (facilitating and protecting human rights), non-government (managing and facilitating 
dialog and negotiation processes), international (providing funding for insertion programs), and 
government (facilitating and providing certain conditions for dialog and negotiation) 
organizations. Some of the concessions that the Government provided in order to achieve a 
reduction of homicides were within the law, but others generated confusion and they seemed 
to be close to the legal or socially acceptable limits. This fact, along with the poor transparency 
of authorities in the management of the practice with public media and public weakened the 
process and postponed its continuity.  
 The present study suggests that gang truces should only be used as a means of last resort, 
and then only under certain conditions.  Given the risks associated with a gang truce, 
communities with high levels, or at least modest levels, of formal social control should rely on 
other more promising gang control strategies such as pulling levers (i.e., Boston Ceasefire), 
community oriented policing, and the Gang Resistance Education and Training (aka GREAT) 
program. Only when the state has limited or greatly reduced capacity for social control should a 
truce be considered. Concomitantly, a gang truce should be considered as an alternative only 
when a community is experiencing a substantial amount of gang violence. Communities that 
are experiencing minimal to modest amount of gang violence may risk more from the 
                                                          
22 Pragmatically this issue is complicated. On the one hand, transparency is a foundational element within a 
democracy and is necessary to ensure proper oversight of the government. On the other hand, it might not be 
possible to implement a gang truce with too many actors having a voice. Policymakers might consider creating a 
policy that allows such negotiations take place but requires particular actors (such as a judicial body) to be 
informed of the process to ensure transparency and adherence to the rule of law. 
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establishment of a gang truce than they have to gain.  Additionally, our findings suggest that a 
gang truce might only be feasible when gangs are sufficiently well organized to be able to 
regulate their members’ behavior and cause their members to behave less violently. In El 
Salvador there is evidence of the strong organizational structure of gang MS13. Among other 
factors, the magnitude of its membership, the chain of command from its leaders in prison and 
the discipline of its leaders in the streets seemed confirmed. On the contrary, the 
organizational structure of gang Barrio 18 – divided in two factions fighting over the leadership 
– showed to be a less stable counterpart within the truce. 
Finally, dialog and negotiations processes with or between gangs must have the capacity to 
promise and deliver immediate benefits to the gangs that gang members can see or experience 
in order to secure their continued participation in the truce, as well as the capacity to monitor 
and respond to truce violations. Most importantly, any effort aimed at reducing violence is 
important and should be examined and assessed but it must have a transparent foundation, 
especially when it affects population rights as a whole. 
 General recommendations  
Gang truces are conjunctural strategies. States who suffer from gang-related violence must 
establish permanent public policies for crime control and prevention. A government that 
considers implementing a gang truce should be aware that it cannot become the center 
strategy of its public policy for citizen safety.  
Gang truces should only be used as a means of last resort, and then only under certain 
conditions.  Stakeholders must determine whether a process of dialog or negotiation with gangs 
is legal, ethical, and feasible.  
Stakeholders must anticipate demands that are likely to arise, and their response options. Some 
demands may be easily met, such as improved prison conditions. Others are much more 
difficult and amorphous, such as: community development through more integrated violence 
prevention programs (such as those implemented by SolucionES in El Salvador); local economic 
development programs; or economic reinsertion of ex-gang members.  
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Stakeholders should incorporate immediately achievable and demonstrable deliverables.  Long-
term goals and promises are unlikely to create the trust needed to sustain a gang truce.  
Stakeholders must first determine the position in which they are negotiating, the incentives that 
are possible to deliver, and the boundaries and limits they face. Gangs are mostly likely to trust 
representatives from NGOs, community-based organizations, and members of the faith based 
community as brokers because they are considered more reliably neutral advocates for peace. 
They need to understand the capacity of the government to deliver promises in a timely 
manner.  
Governments have to make a choice about the visibility and transparency of its participation. 
This decision needs to be made in the context of the national and local laws, the public’s 
expectations of transparency, and patterns of practices of the past.  
Governments must be strategic in their support for truce initiatives. Some donor funded 
programs run by the government prohibit gang member participation; and if the government 
does not receive approval from the donor, it may risk the donor withdrawing its sponsorship of 
the program. 
Governments must ensure an inter-institutional coordination for the management of truces to 
avoid the responsibility to be of a single government institution. It is necessary to generate or 
collect reliable and pertinent data that can be used to analyze and assess the process. 
It is necessary to implement an effective monitoring system of the truce process, similar to that 
used in the full report, as it can help parties understand what is working and who is delivering 
on their promises. More specifically, the monitoring and truce management system should be 
able to identify truce violations and be prepared to respond through the use of legal and 
effective practices if stakeholders do not comply.   
Finally, it is necessary to develop evaluations of gang truces and monitoring programs, and 
support violence prevention activities, local economic development activities, and pilot 
programs to support the reinsertion of ex-gang members into society. Clearly national 
governments, municipal governments, NGOs, and community-based organizations need 
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increased capacity and resources to discourage the growth of gangs among at-risk youth.  It is 
therefore increasingly important to create economic opportunities for gang members willing to 
leave the gangs and find other legal employment. Developing and sustaining those 
opportunities in nations with high incidences of poverty will require significant international 
funding. 
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